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November 13, 2006  
 
Abstract:  This paper examines the adjustment of developing country labor markets to 
macroeconomic shocks.  It models a two sector labor market: a formal salaried (tradable) 
sector that may or may not be affected by union or legislation induced wage rigidities, 
and an unregulated (nontradable) self-employment sector facing liquidity constraints to 
entry. This is embedded i n a standard small economy macro model that permits the 
derivation of patterns of comovement among relative salaried/self-employed incomes, 
salaried/self-employed sector sizes and the real exchange rate with respect to different 
types of shocks in contexts with and without wage rigidities.  The paper then explores 
time series data from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico to test for cointegrating 
relationships corresponding to the patterns predicted by theory.  We identify two types of 
regime. The first corresponds to periods where demand shocks to the nontradable sector 
offer new opportunities to (informal) entrepreneurs, the informal sector expands 
“procyclically,” and the exchange rate overshoots toward appreciation in the short run, or 
remains at its productivity determined levels.  The second corresponds to periods of 
negative shocks to the formal salaried sector in the presence of wage rigidities where the 
sector plays a more traditional “buffer” role during downturns.   
 
JEL: Informality, Labor market dynamics, Self-employment, Real exchange 
rates.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
  The debate over the role of informal workers  -those unprotected by labor 
legislation- in the developing country labor market goes back almost half a century.  A 
prominent stream of the literature has intellectual roots perhaps best distilled in Harris 
and Todaro’s (1970) vision of markets segmented by wage setting in the formal sector 
that leaves the traditional sector rationed out of modern salaried employment.
1  The view 
of the informal sector as the inferior segment of a dual labor market, expanding during 
downturns to absorb increased unemployment, became highly influential in the 
International Labor Organization, its Latin America affiliate, the Latin America Regional 
Employment Program (PREALC), and the World Bank.
2   
 
However, dating at least from Hart’s (1973) work in Africa, a parallel stream has 
stressed the sector’s dynamism and the likely voluntary nature of much of the entry into 
informal self-employment, analogous to the mainstream literature such as Jovanovic 
(1982), and Evans and Jovanovic (1989), and Evans and Leighton (1989).
3  Recent work 
has called into question the value of the conditional income comparisons, commonly used 
to demonstrate segmentation, both on conceptual and empirical grounds.
4 Further, a first 
look at time series for Mexico suggests more nuanced cyclical behavior than that of a 
shock absorber during downturns.  Figure 1 plots the evolution of the relative salaried/ 
informal self-employed sector sizes and respective earnings and shows that during the 
recovery of 1987-1991 both the relative size of the informal self-employed sector relative 
to the formal sector, and the relative earnings of the self-employed rise, consistent with a 
procyclical expansion of that sector. Since roughly 75% of the informal self-employed 
are found in services, transportation or construction, it is plausible that the boom in real 
estate and other non-tradable industries across this period created new opportunities for 
entrepreneurs who, for whatever reason, chose to be informal.
5  That this episode is not a 
                                                 
1 In fact, in Harris and Todaro’s model, the “traditional” sector was the rural sector disposed to migrate. 
However, it represents perhaps the first analytically worked out view of the dual labor market and remains 
highly relevant to the debate over the segmented rural sector.  
2 For early statements, see Sethuraman (1981), Tokman (1978), Mazumdar (1975), respectively.   
3 See for more recent formulations in this vein, de Soto (1989) and Maloney (2004).  
4 See Maloney 1999, Pratap and Quintin 2006 
5 The self-employed are concentrated in nontradables: Brazil 92%, Colombia 87%, Mexico 83%.     2 
statistical anomaly is suggested by  Loayza and Rigolini’s (2006) recent finding of pro-
cyclical movement in the informal sector in several of their sample of 42 countries.  
However, it is also the case that the subsequent period leading up to the crisis of 1995, 
the countercyclical movements envisaged by more traditional segmentation views appear, 
manifested as a negative comovement of earnings and labor market sector sizes. 
 
  These distinct patterns suggest that the pro- or countercyclicality of the two labor 
market sectors may depend on the sectoral origin of the shocks, and the presence of 
binding wage rigidities.  They also suggest that time series data on these series may offer 
potentially useful labor market diagnostics, for instance, in identifying the roots of 
expansion of the informal sector across a given period.  However, for this to be the case, 
we need to understand the drivers of the very large observed movements in relative 
wages which in a textbook world, would be forced to equivalence. Three  effects in 
principle may be at play: barriers to the arbitrage of labor earnings due to barriers to entry 
to either sector, barriers to arbitraging of returns to capital of the self-employed which are 
generally not separable in labor market surveys from earnings of labor  per se, and 
changes in the skills composition of the sectoral work forces.   
 
  To capture these effects, we begin by constructing a model of developing country 
labor markets that is firmly rooted in the established advanced country literature. We 
postulate two sectors: a salaried (tradable) sector where workers receive a wage and are 
covered by labor legislation or unions; and a nontradable self-employed sector of the kind 
postulated by Lucas (1978) with heterogeneity in level of entrepreneurial ability and 
where, following Evans and Jovanovic (1989), credit constraints can constitute a barrier 
to entry from salaried work.  Self-employed workers receive a variable return to invested 
capital and their labor which, due to capital adjustment costs arising from credit 
constraints, may deviate from long run equilibrium levels.  
 
We locate this labor market in a standard macroeconomic framework (Obstfeld 
and Rogoff 1996) that allows us to capture additional information on the sectoral origin 
of the shocks through the real exchange rate - a measure of relative prices of tradables   3 
and nontradables.  This allows us to move beyond simply defining cyclical movements as 
a deviation from trend and to characterize the nature of the shocks driving it. Given the 
high concentration of the informal self-employed in the nontradables sector, we are able 
to derive patterns of comovement between the relative returns and relative sizes of 
salaried and self-employed sectors, and the real exchange rate. 
 
  Finally, we introduce potential wage rigidities in the salaried tradable sector. As 
in the classic Harris-Todaro formulation, formalized in Rauch (1991), the labor market 
can become segmented with workers rationed out of salaried/tradable employment and 
being forced into the self-employed/nontradables sector where earnings adjust to equate 
labor supply and demand.  This segmentation gives rise to distinct patterns of 
comovement of the three series in response to productivity or demand shocks.   
   
Thus, we provide an integrated model of LDC labor markets that permits 
developing a typology of comovements of macroeconomic time series that, once 
identified, can help identify the source of shocks and the presence or absence of formal 
sector segmenting distortions. The latter offers an alternative to unreliable conditional 
income comparisons.
6  Empirically, we employ multivariate cointegration techniques to 
establish these predicted patterns of comovement and their evolution over the last two 
decades in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. These countries all have large 
informal self-employed sectors, and have experienced very large movements in levels of 
economic activity, the relative sizes of the two labor market sectors, and real exchange 
rates.
7   
 
We confirm episodes of expansion of informal self-employment consistent with 
the traditional segmentation views.  However, we also identify episodes consistent with 
                                                 
6  Total returns to Informal self employment and salaried employment incorporate differences in taxes, risk 
premia, flexibility, etc all of which will lead to incomes not being equated, even in the absence of 
segmentation.  See Maloney (1999). 
7  In Mexico from 1988-1995, Argentina 1990-1995, and Brazil beginning in 1992, the exchange rate 
appreciated, often dramatically, following stabilization policies that fixed the nominal exchange rate, 
liberalized capital markets, and implemented other reforms.     4 
the sectoral expansion being driven by a positive demand shock to the nontradables 
sector and “procyclical” behavior of the informal self-employed sector.  
 
2. A  Model   
 
We consider the case of a small economy that produces two composite goods, 
tradables and nontradables. The salaried sector is assumed to produce tradables (T), the 
numeraire, while the production  of nontradables is concentrated in the self-employed 
sector (N)
8. All workers are homogenous when salaried. However, following Lucas 
(1978), self-employed sector individuals (j) differ in terms of entrepreneurial capability, 
fj distributed uniformly on [0,1]. For simplicity, we also normalize the labor force to 
unity so that, provided that the economy is not in a corner solution, the value of 
entrepreneurial ability of individual m, who is indifferent between salaried work and self-
employment, also corresponds to the size of the salaried labor force.  That is, fm = f* = 
LT where f* is the ability of the individual who is indifferent between self-employment 
and wage work. Thus, we preserve the overall labor supply constraint while building in a 
decrease in the marginal entrepreneurial ability as labor shifts toward self-employment. 
 
Tradable output  T Y  is CRS in capital  T K  and labor  LT: 
( )
T T
T T T T T T T L K A L K F A Y
a a - = =
1 , . Production of individual j in the self-employed sector 
is given by 
N
j j N j k A y
a f = . 
 
Labor is mobile across sectors, but entrepreneurs planning to switch sectors must 
accumulate or decumulate their capital before doing so.  Because we appear to observe 
non-arbitraged wage differentials, we assume that, though capital is mobile both 
internationally and across sectors, there are adjustment costs that prevent this from 
happening instantaneously. For the self-employed sector, capital markets are not perfect 
and, as Evans and Jovanovic (1989) demonstrated for the US, entrepreneurs are often 
                                                 
8 As usually assumed, one unit of tradables can be transformed into a unit of capital at no cost. The reverse 
is also true. Nontradables can be used only for consumption. Capital can be used for production and then 
consumed (as a tradable) at the end of the same period.    5 
credit constrained.  We capture this by assuming that those entering self-employment 
must install some capital the period before producing and pay a standard deadweight 














c , where Ij represents the change 
in capital stock between two successive periods for self-employed individual j and c is 
inversely related to the speed of adjustment.  ( ) j k h , a linear function of capital 
accumulated by the self-employed individual  j. We further assume that individuals 
willing to leave self-employment must dispose of all the capital they have in place before 
they become employed in the salaried sector.
9  This specification ensures that the labor 
market will not adjust fully in one period and that differentials in net remuneration among 
sectors are not instantly arbitraged by labor flows.  This permits us to analyze both steady 
state movements in relative wages, relative sector sizes and exchange rates, but, also 
transitional dynamics.  
 
2.1 The firm 
The representative tradable sector firm maximizes 
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where wT,s is the wage (gross) prevailing in the tradables sector at time t=s. The world 
interest rate r, expressed in terms of tradables, is assumed to be constant.  The first order 
conditions are standard: 
 
( ) r k f A T T = '                     (1) 
( ) ( ) [ ] T T T T T w k k f k f A = - '                 (2) 
 
 
                                                 
9 This specification ensures that (de)installation costs are always finite. Further, since marginal costs of 
capital (de)installation are increasing, capital adjustment will not happen instantaneously.   6 
Because r is the world interest rate expressed in terms of tradables, it must correspond to 
the marginal product of capital in the salaried/tradable sector. The wage prevailing in the 
sector is equal to labor’s marginal productivity.  Because both factors do not shift 
instantaneously across sectors, these two conditions may fail to hold ex-post in the event 
of unanticipated shocks. 
 




























+ t s s j
s j
s j












, , 2 1
1 c
f
a           subject to:  s j s j s j k k I , 1 , , - = + . 
 
  The first order condition is given by 
 
( ) s j
s
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a         (4) 
 
where q denotes the shadow price of installed capital in nontradables and p denotes the 
price of nontradables relative to the price of tradables. In other words, p is simply the 
inverse of the real exchange rate defined as the relative price of traded goods in terms of 
non-traded goods.  Equation (3) indicates that investment is positive only for values of q 
larger than 1. Equation (4) is a standard investment Euler equation. In the long run, it 
must also be true for all self-employed individuals that returns to capital equal the market 




j N j N =
-1 a a f                   (4’) 
 
and that the pivotal individual is indifferent between wage work and self-employment: 
 
( ) T N N w k pA
N = -




2.2 The Consumer 
As is standard, we assume that the economy is inhabited by an infinitely-lived 
representative consumer whose demand and asset holdings are identified with aggregate 
national counterparts and who maximizes a lifetime utility function of the form   







t C C u U , b . 
Where  T C  and  N C  stand for consumption in the tradables and nontradables sectors. 
( ) N T C C , F  is a linear homogenous function of its arguments and u(.) is isoelastic with 
intertemporal substitution elasticity s. The b element is the standard time-preference 
factor which is exogenously given. We assume that the representative consumer owns a 




The representative consumer faces a lifetime budget constraint 
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where national financial wealth  t T t N t t K K B Q , , + + =  is measured in terms of tradables 
and B stands for net aggregate holdings of foreign assets. IN,s represents total investment 
and KN,s total capital accumulated in the self-employed sector at date s. 
 














                  (5) 
                                                 
10 It would be equivalent to consider the case where producers directly borrow capital from the 
representative consumer and the latter is the one who would take the investment decisions as shown in 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).   8 
 
relative intratemporal consumption depends only on the relative price p and not upon 
consumer's spending level where g  indicates the weight of the traded good in the utility 
function and q  represents the constant (and strictly positive) elasticity of substitution 






























.                (6) 
 
A rise in the relative price of nontradables causes growth in tradables consumption 
growth relative to nontradables consumption.
12  
   
Since, by assumption nontradables can only be consumed, in equilibrium 
consumption equals production in the self-employed sector. Substitution and the 
combination of the Euler equation for tradables consumption with the lifetime budget 
constraint of the representative consumer yield an expression for the optimal 
consumption of tradables: 












































































, ,        (7) 
 
where P is the price index P = 
q q g g
- - - +





                                                                                                                                                 
11 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, pp 226-235) for a full derivation. 
12 Note that if s = q, tradables consumption remains constant along the perfect foresight paths.   9 
2.3 Properties of the Model 
 
Before turning to the dynamics of the economy, we first describe its steady state 
equilibrium and assess the impact of permanent productivity and consumption shocks. 
We then introduce a wage rigidity in the salaried sector.  The results of all exercises are 
tabulated in Table 1.  
 
2.3.1 Shocks in the Long Run 
 
Productivity shocks are represented by a permanent variation in the A productivity 
scale coefficients and demand shocks by a permanent variation in the g parameter.  In the 







). Log differentiation leads 
to the following results, assuming that initial p = 1 and initial g is equal to one half.  
 
Relative Prices: Differentiating (4’) and aggregating across all j gives 
( ) 0 ˆ ˆ 1 * ˆ ˆ ˆ * = = - - + + r k A p N N a f  
Although individual ability remains constant by assumption,  0 ˆ = j f  and hence the capital 
growth rate is the same for everyone, the labor reallocation after a shock results in a 
change in the pivotal individual so that  * ˆ f  is no longer equal to zero for the labor force 
as a whole.  By the same logic  
T N N w k A p ˆ ˆ * ˆ ˆ ˆ * = + + + a f  
where  j k k ˆ ˆ





= , h , labors’ share in 
tradables output,   T
LT
T A w ˆ 1 ˆ
h
= , and then  
N T
LT












 close to 1, 
the real exchange rate is determined by the relative rates of productivity growth.    10 
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N  . 
In order to simplify the analysis we assume that total financial wealth remains constant 
across steady states. We assume implicitly that any variation in the total level of physical 
capital is fully offset by an equal, but opposite variation in foreign assets holdings. That 
is, with international borrowing, a rise in the stock of physical capital for instance, can be 
financed by an equal fall in B without affecting the level of total financial wealth
13. This 
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Changes in nontradables consumption can be written as   
( ) ( )p Z C N ˆ 1 ˆ
^ ^
g qg g - + - + - =  
and changes in total production in the self-employment sector (expressed in units of 
tradables) by 







= p A pY N
N
N . 
Since nontradable goods market equilibrium requires that  N N Y C ˆ ˆ = ,  the entrepreneurial 
ability of the pivotal worker, and implicitly, the share of the workforce in tradables, can 
be written as:   
                                                 
13 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Chap. 4) for an application.   11 
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where  ( ) [ ]
1
1 1
- + Y - = W LT se j j . 
 
Relative Earnings: The change in self-employment production expressed in tradables 
units is now: 







































2 . The relative change in total production also corresponds to 
the relative variation in entrepreneurs’ earnings, w Nj, as the latter is a constant proportion 
of the former. The change in average self-employment production expressed in terms of 
tradables units can be written as: 
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In order to qualify the dynamics of the model in the event of a shock, we linearize 
the first order conditions for profit maximization by the self-employed around the steady   12 
state. The latter being characterized by  1 = q  (q denotes the shadow price of installed 
capital in nontradables) and,  j k  we obtain 
( ) j
t







= - +                  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]( ) j t j j N t j
j
N t t k k k r q k
k h






+ - = - + , 1 1 1 1 1 a
c
a .       
 
The equations Dkj = 0 and Dqj = 0 characterize the equilibrium dynamics. They are 
depicted in a two-equation phase diagram in  q and kj that shows the dynamics of the 
investment decisions of self-employed individuals (figure 2). The line denoted by SS 
indicates the perfect foresight path.  
 
As the steady state level of investment chosen by each individual is not identical, 
we expect to observe that a common shock affects heterogeneous individuals differently. 
When a shock leads to a contraction of the self-employment sector, for workers whose 
entrepreneurial ability falls below the threshold steady state value of  f* (those who 
would be better off in the wage work sector), the perfect foresight path leads to zero 
capital and zero capital shadow value at steady state, as depicted in figure 3. Should self-








0 - independent of the wage 
prevailing in the salaried sector since the initial shadow value of their capital is above 1 
(q0=1/r ). Due to heterogeneous entrepreneurial ability, workers will not all move across 
sectors in the same period. For instance, in the case of a shock leading to a rise in returns 
to self-employment, more able entrepreneurs in the salaried sector would move first. A 
detailed analysis is presented in Appendix 2.  
 
The adjustment to the steady state depends on the relative values of s  and q.  
Indeed, CT,t is given by (7) which suggests that the level of tradables consumption along 
the saddle path is affected by variations in p in a manner that could either reinforce or 
offset the impact of a shock. The impact of a rise in p on consumption is dampened by   13 
consumers’ inter-temporal choices if s >q , and amplified if s <q.  If s >q, consumption 
of nontradables declines slower than consumption of tradables. The opposite occurs if 
s <  q. This implies that migration takes longer in a situation when inter-temporal 




2.4 Responses to Productivity and Demand Shocks 
 
  In order to define short/medium term properties we need to qualify "on-impact" 
effects of various shocks. Short/medium term properties would then reflect variables' 
behavior after impact and during the transition towards the new steady state. On impact, 
levels of production and consumption must remain constant. Thus any wealth effects 
generated by the shock must be offset by an instantaneous change in prices. In order to 
simplify the analysis, we assume that changes in wealth occurring on impact reflect only 
the shock’s direct effects.
14 That is, changes in wealth due to subsequent changes in 
prices are accounted for in the long run. This assumption does not affect qualitatively the 
properties of the model. 
 
  We first assess the impact of permanent productivity and consumption shocks. 
We then introduce wage rigidities in the salaried sector. The results of all exercises are 
presented in Table 1. 
 
Productivity Shock to the Tradables Sector 
In the event of a productivity shock to the tradables sector,  0
^
> T A ,  0
^
= N A  and 
0
^
= g , both production of the sector as well as returns to capital and labor increase. This 
increases demands for both types of goods and causes the exchange rate to appreciate (p 
                                                 












+ =  and 
( ) ( ) 0 ˆ 1 ˆ
^ ^
= - + - + - = p Z C N g qg g    14 
rises) to clear the nontradables market. In addition, along the perfect foresight adjustment 
path, some self-employed find it more profitable to move to the salaried sector.
15 The 
shadow value of their capital falls below 1 and, as it falls towards zero in the long run 
they disinvest. However, since capital adjusts with a lag, they cannot migrate until their 
capital has been completely dismantled. Tradable firms must also wait for the following 
period to adjust their capital. Therefore, on impact only prices adjust
16 and average self-
employed earnings follow the initial rise in p.  As the economy adjusts, self-employed 
earnings fall relative to salaried sector wages
17 as does the share of workers in self-
employment.
18 Hence, in both  the short run and long run, wT / w N increases, LT / L N 
increases and, consistent with Balassa-Samuelson, p rises relative to its initial level. 
 
Productivity Shock to the Nontradables Sector 
Consistent with standard models, if  0
^
= T A ,  0
^
> N A , and  0
^
= g , in the steady 
state, the relative price of nontradables will decrease in proportion to the productivity 
shock in nontradables. Both capital intensity and earnings in the self-employed sector 
will be left unchanged. However, on impact  p rises due to increased demand for 
nontradables. It then falls along the transition path. This could be qualified as  p 
undershooting. Individuals who are already self-employed at the time of the shock and 
                                                 
15 Workers whose sequence of returns from self-employment remains above that of the salaried wage face 
q>1 and they accumulate more capital. 
16 On impact,
( ) ( )
T






= , which also corresponds to the initial rise in average earnings in the 
informal sector. The initial rise in formal wages is equal to  T A ˆ  and remains larger than the rise in self-
employed average earnings for reasonable values of ? and ?. 
17 Total self-employed production and earnings, measured in tradables units, depends on the sign of 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] [ ] 1 1 1 1 1
ˆ





. It is straightforward to check that the expression 








ˆ = , on average self-employed earnings fall in the 
long run relative to workers earnings in the salaried sector for any value of  2 W  and q.  
 
18 In the steady state the direction of change of the employment share of self-employment depends on the 
sign of  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 1 1 1 1 - - - + - + q g a j j N se LT . The expression is unambiguously negative implying 
that the share of self-employed workers falls.   15 
who, with perfect foresight know that relative prices will continue to fall, do not modify 
their capital stock (their shadow value q remains equal to unity), but the increase in 
productivity does, in the short run, increase their production and yield higher relative 
earnings. This induces migration from the tradables sector and will eventually drive 
returns back to the pre-shock level.
19 However, to attract the marginal entrepreneur to 
self-employment, relative earnings in this sector will rise. Hence, in both the short and 
the long run, wT / wN, , LT / LN   and p decrease. 
 
Shift in Preferences toward Nontradables 
A shift in preferences, for instance, towards nontradables consumption  0
^
= T A , 
0
^
= N A  and  0
^
< g  increases self-employment as well as absolute and relative 
consumption of nontradables. On impact, the increased demand for nontradables causes 
the exchange rate to appreciate,
20 and relative self-employed earnings and the shadow 
value of capital increase.  This attracts new entrepreneurs to the sector, expanding 
nontradables supply and driving the relative price of nontradables, p, back to its initial, 
relative productivity-determined level.  However, because marginal entrepreneurs are 
attracted to the sector, relative self-employment earnings must rise in the steady state. 
This represents an important case where both w T / w N and LT / LN  fall with an initial 
appreciation and then continue to do so as the exchange rate depreciates again back to its 
initial level.   
 
Negative Salaried/Tradables Productivity Shock with Salaried Sector Wage 
Rigidities 
 
  Unions or mandatory minimum wages may introduce downward nominal wage 
rigidities in the salaried sector that can reverse some of the above findings. As the 
derivation of the steady state is complex, detail is deferred to appendix A.1. In the case 
                                                 
19 The sign of  ( ) ( ) q g - - 1 1  determines the impact on self-employment. It is positive for any positive 
value of the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution. 
20 






p  and  0
^
< g .   16 
where  0
^
< T A ,  0
^
= N A , and  0
^
= g , a negative shock to tradables’ productivity puts 
downward pressure on nominal wages in the salaried sector. However, because of 
downward wage rigidities, consumption is not affected on impact and hence, there is no 
effect on relative prices,  p.  But the salaried sector will eventually adjust through 
quantities and released labor will flow into the non-traded sector increasing its 
production, driving down  p,  and reducing average self-employed earnings. For the 
already self-employed, the fall in  p observed along the transition path, leads to 
disinvestment in  capital. However, since there is now rationing in the salaried sector, 
migration to the salaried sector is not possible and workers with relatively low 
entrepreneurial ability will earn less than what they would in the salaried sector. Hence, 
average earnings in the self-employed sector have fallen relative to the salaried sector 
while the size of self-employment has increased: we should see wT / wN  and LT / LN 
moving against each other.
21 This is the classic segmentation view: the informal sector 
absorbs released labor during downturns to which we also now add that p falls as well. 
There are some parameter values which can lead to appreciation and a positive 
comovement of the labor market series.  However, as detailed in appendix A.1, they are 




3. Empirics  
 
The previous section shows that very standard models anchored in the mainstream 
literature yield clear hypotheses of comovements among the three series.  Two 
conclusions are important. First, independent of skill heterogeneity and adjustment costs, 
under no conditions can we generate a counter movement of relative sector sizes and 
earnings in the absence of a wage rigidity: observed counter movements imply 
                                                 
21 As long as wages in the salaried workers do not adjust, average earnings in self-employment 
unambiguously fall with respect to the former. Then, along the transition towards steady state, average 
earnings in the self-employed sector have fallen relative to the salaried sector while the size of self-
employment has increased. As mentioned in the previous section, this is also true in the new steady state if 
appendix A.1, condition (1) is satisfied.   17 
segmentation and if we detect them empirically, this is evidence of labor market 
distortions.  Second, in all cases, the short run labor market dynamics move in the same 
direction as the steady state and only in the case of a shock to preferences for 
nontradables does the exchange rate overshoot in the short-run.   
 
We explore the patterns of comovement between relative sector sizes, relative 
earnings and the real exchange rate for Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and Colombia using 
the multivariate Johansen (1988) approach. (see appendix A.3). Although cointegration is 
sometimes given the economic interpretation of capturing “long run” relations, as 
Granger (1991) and Hakkio and Rush argue (1991) at core it is a statistical relationship 
existing among non-stationary series that can occur at any frequency or span.
22 In our 
case, relative sector sizes, earnings and the real exchange rate are plausibly I(1) and they 
always appear to be so in the analysis.
23 Since overshooting or undershooting (as found in 
the case of a productivity shock or a demand shock respectively to the nontradables 
sector) can take a number of years to return to long run equilibrium, our short/medium 
runs can, in fact, represent quite persistent phenomena that will be identified by the 





We use quarterly data for Mexico, Brazil and Colombia and semi-annual data for 
Argentina (see Appendix A.4 for data definitions and details) to generate the earnings 
ratio of salaried over self-employed workers, wT / wN , and the ratio of the absolute size of 
the salaried over the self-employed sector, LT / LN .  To the degree possible, we try to be 
consistent across surveys and in spirit be close to the ILO definitions: we treat the male 
population that reports being employed in firms of greater than 6 workers as salaried 
                                                 
22 See  Hakkio and Rush (1991) Cointegration: How long is the long-run?: "Clearly, the length of the 
'long-run' may vary between problems, that is, for some issues the long- run may be a matter of decades 
while for others a matter of months." 
23  Theoretically, however, it is legitimate to include an I(0) variable in the cointegrating relationship, 
although we would expect at least one cointegrating vector to emerge that captures simply the stationary 
series.  In practice, these series were never stationary across our sample and the problem was moot.   18 
(tradable) workers. Own-account workers or heads of firms employing fewer than 5 
employees paying no social security contributions and excluding professionals and 
technicians, constitute the informal self-employed (nontradable) sector.  Real exchange 
rates, p, were taken from International Financial Statistics.  The series are plotted in 
Figure 1 with the exchange rate inverted for greater graphical clarity (an upward 
movement here and here alone is a depreciation).  
 
Three issues merit note.  First, even if remuneration is equalized in both sectors, 
we do not observe non-monetary remuneration (independence, benefits foregone, taxes 
avoided, implicit returns to capital, etc.) and hence we may observe a wedge in observed 
returns even in equilibrium. We assume that these non-monetary components are a 
constant fraction of monetary earnings and hence that changes in relative monetary 
earnings are a good proxy for relative changes in total remuneration.  Second, variations 
in definitions and the composition of payment can cause substantial differences in ratios 
of relative earnings across countries.  As a final caveat, we do not model or study those 
salaried workers who are uncovered by labor legislation and hence are informal.  While 
this group is substantially smaller than the informal self-employed, its particular cyclical 




We begin by estimating separate VAR models for Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and 
Colombia. We include a constant, lags for p, wT / wN and LT/LN  as well as time dummies 
in the cointegration space. These specifications prove sufficient to produce random 
errors. The model specifications for the three models are presented in Tables A.1-A.3 in 
the AppendixA.4 along with  tests for long-run exclusion, stationarity and weak-
exogeneity. All variables appear to be non-stationary and the diagnostics on the residuals 
of the system point towards the absence of autocorrelation, and n ormality. Sensitivity 
analysis for different lag lengths and with and without dummies further indicated 
robustness of the findings. Trace tests (l trace) indicate one significant cointegrating vector 
for all three models (Table A.2).  Normalizing the cointegration vectors on the 1
st   19 




 LT/LN  + ßW wT / wN  + ßp p + ßC = 0 
 
Thus, the signs on the first three parameters (beginning with the normalized coefficient 
on L T/LN) correspond directly to those in table 1. Hence, a finding of a positive 
coefficient on relative earnings implies an integrated labor market, while a negative 
coefficient indicates a segmented market.    
 
The theoretical model suggests that different shocks, or differing degrees of 
salaried sector rigidities, should lead to different regimes and hence different 
cointegration vectors across subsamples.  To identify potential shifts in the degree of 
labor market segmentation, and for an indication of potential break dates we plot rolling 
correlation coefficient of the two labor variables (figures 4). We then test for specific 
cointegrating vectors across separate periods for our full model specification.   
 
For both A rgentina and Colombia, our correlation analysis  suggests the only 
significant comovements between the two labor market variables to be negative with 
incipient but never statistically significant shifts toward the positive.   This, combined 
with the relatively limited degrees of freedom in these cases  led us to abandon search for 
regime change and we report only the full sample result in table 2.  However, both 
Mexico and Brazil do suggest periods where the correlations flip signs and significantly 
so  suggesting that in some moments the market is behaving in a more integrated fashion, 
and sometimes in a more segmented fashion.  In Mexico, for example, the period around 
the crisis, roughly 1993 to 1997 shows a negative and significant correlation. However, 
on either side of the crisis, the boom prior to 1991 and after the recovery around 1999 and 
2004, we identify periods of statistically significant positive correlation. As Brazil also 
exhibits both patterns with statistical significance, we proceed for these two countries to a 
subsample investigation and estimate cointegrating vectors for respective sub periods. 
   20 
Our results provide strong evidence for two types of regimes. First, in Brazil 
during 1994-97 and in Mexico in the periods 1987-91 and 1998-04, we find a positive 
comovement of the two labor series. This suggests an integrated market and a positive 
demand shock to the nontradables sector. Traditionally, Mexican and Brazilian minimum 
wages are not especially binding, and in these samples, both economies were going 
through something of a boom.
24 In the two Mexican cases, the appreciation of the 
exchange rate suggests that we are not yet in the long run. In the Brazilian case, the 
coefficient on the real exchange rate is statistically insignificant suggesting that we have 
reached the long run equilibrium where markets have adjusted to erode the short term 
overshooting. 
 
In a second regime, Argentina, Brazil in the periods 1983-89 and 1998-02, 
Colombia, and Mexico during 1992-96, all correspond to the case of a negative shock to 
the formal/traded sector in the presence of wage rigidities.  In this sense, we find the 
classic informal/non-tradable sector adjusting to take in labor no longer absorbed in the 
formal sector. This is historically plausible. Across  these periods, all four countries 
experienced deep recessions where wages may not have been able to adjust sufficiently to 
prevent segmentation.  In addition, Colombia’s minimum wage was the most binding in 
Latin America while Argentina, although not showing especially high minimum wages, 





  This paper has offered an integrated view of the developing country labor market 
and its behavior across macroeconomic fluctuations.  We model a two sector labor 
market in a Rogoff-Obstfeld small economy model to include heterogeneous 
entrepreneurial ability and credit constraints to entering informal self-employment.   This 
allows us to generate a set of hypotheses about the comovement of relative sector sizes 
and earnings and sectoral shocks as captured by the real exchange rate.   
                                                 
24 See Maloney and Nunez (2004)   21 
 
  These patterns of comovement are then tested in a cointegration framework and 
offer provocative results.  First, the informal self-employed and formal salaried sectors 
often appear as one integrated labor market, rather than segmented or dual labor markets 
as customarily envisaged: numerous periods show strong comovement between 
relativesector sizes and earnings.  This suggests that a large component of the informal 
sector should not be viewed as somehow inferior or queuing for formal sector 
employment.  However, it is also the case that rigidities in the formal salaried sector can 
become binding, as appears to be most dramatically the case in Colombia, and lead to 
patterns consistent with the traditional segmentation hypothesis of adjustment.  These 
distinct patterns suggest that the pro or countercyclicality of the sectors may depend on 
the sectoral origin of the shocks, and the presence of binding wage rigidities.   
   22 
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Table 1: Predicted Patterns of Comovement among Relative Earnings, Relative   
Sector Sizes, and the Real Exchange Rate  
Short / 
Medium Run 
  D ( wT / wN )  D( LT / LN )  Dp 
DAT > 0  > 0  > 0  > 0 
DAN > 0 






Dg< 0  < 0  < 0 
0 >  
(oversh.) 
Wage Rigidities  DAT < 0  > 0  < 0  < 0 
         
Long Run         
DAT > 0  > 0  > 0  > 0 




Dg< 0  < 0  < 0  0 
Wage Rigidities  DAT < 0  > 0  < 0  < 0 
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    Table 2: Cointegration Coefficients Among  Relative Sector Sizes, Relative Earnings, and the Real Exchange Rate  
  Argentina  Brazil  Colombia  Mexico 
               Sample    Full  Full  1983-89  1994-97  1998-02  Full  Full  1987-91  1992-04  1998-04 
Variables                     
LT/LN  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 





























































 (From Table 1) 
DAT < 0 
rigidities 




DAT < 0 
rigidities 
DAT < 0 
rigidities 
Mixed  Dg< 0 
SR 




Note: Cointegration vectors between relative tradable/nontradables (Formal/Informal Self-employment) size measured in employment,  
relative tradable/nontradable earnings, and the real exchange rate.  Vector presented as  LT/LN  + ßW wT / wN  + ßp p + ßC = 0. 
 (t-statistics in parentheses).   27 
  
Figure 1: Relative Sector Shares and Earnings, Real Exchange Rate 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own estimates based on ENEU (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano) and IFS. 
 
Notes: Wage F/SE captures the relative earnings of the formal salaried vs informal self employed 
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Figure 4: Rolling Correlation between relative sector size and relative wages 
 
Note: 16 period rolling window, dashed lines represent 10% level of significance (0.426). Values above 
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Appendix A.1: Details on  Negative Tradables Productivity Shock with Salaried 
Sector Wage Rigidities 
 
Unions or mandatory minimum wages may introduce downward nominal wage 
rigidities in the salaried sector that can reverse many of the findings above. 
A negative shock to productivity in the tradables sector translates into nominal 
wage downward pressures in the salaried sector. Nominal wage downward rigidities, if 
persistent, would lead to a non-optimal and thus unstable equilibrium. In order to obtain a 
possibly stable equilibrium, we assume that nominal wages are adjusted to satisfy the first 
order conditions of firms operating in the tradables sector. However, we assume that 
wage variations represent the last element of adjustment. That is, labor movements are 
precluded after wages have been adjusted. As a consequence, the pivotal individual could 
end up in a situation where belonging to either one or the other sector does make a 
difference. This is a case of segmentation where the nontradables sector behaves in part 
as a residual sector.  
As both capital and labor are assumed not to move instantaneously, two 
adjustment scenarios are possible. In the first scenario, capital would move first, then 
labor and finally wages. In that scenario, capital adjustment is a two-step process. Capital 
first adjusts to meet (1) in a context of constant salaried labor force. It further adjusts to 
meet (1) considering labor variation obtained by solving (2) with constant wage. Wages 
adjust in a final stage to satisfy (2). In the second scenario, labor would move first, then 
capital and finally wages. In that scenario, capital adjustment is one-step process. Capital 
adjusts to meet (1) after salaried labor has changed to meet (2) with constant capital and 
wage. Wages adjust to meet (2) after labor and capital adjusted. We can expect results to 
be qualitatively similar, as we expect factors of production adjustments to be identically 
signed in both scenarios.  
Taking for instance the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function, salaried 
labor outflow
25 in the first scenario corresponds to 



































Equilibrium of the demand and supply conditions in the nontradables sector 
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The sign of both real exchange rate and average earnings depends upon the sign and 
magnitude of expression  ( ) ( ) ( ) g gq a j a - + - + - 1 1 N se N . This expression is increasing 
with  q,  the elasticity of substitution. For  q=1  (preferences are Cobb-Douglas) for 
instance, the expression is equal to 
se j - 1 . In that case, both the real exchange rate and 
average self-employed earnings are decreasing unambiguously. A sufficient condition for 












se . Unless 
N a  and q are both very 
close to zero and  g very close to one the condition is likely to be always satisfied. 
However, the sufficient condition for both the relative price of nontradables and average 
earnings to be decreasing is more restrictive, namely q £ 1. Average earnings in the self-
employment sector could rise despite the fall in p because in the context of an expansion 
of the sector the contribution per unit of entrepreneurial ability is higher for less able 
workers. This is a feature of the model essentially due to the fact that ability enters in a 
linear manner in the production function of self-employed workers.  
As far as relative earnings are concerned, self-employed workers would become on 
average worst off with respect to salaried workers if  
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This condition is likely to be satisfied for any plausible set of parameters values. 
 
In the second scenario, we obtain 

































The real exchange rate and average self-employed earnings vary according to 
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Conditions presented in the case of the first scenario also apply to the second scenario. 
 
When conditions presented above are satisfied, as labor migrates towards the self-
employed sector, production rises, the real exchange rate depreciates, and average 
earnings in the self-employed sector fall. Moreover, as workers cannot migrate back to 
the salaried sector, those whose entrepreneurial ability is relatively low earn less than 
what they would get in the salaried sector. For those workers “trapped” in the self-
employed sector earnings performance has worsened relative to those employed in the 
salaried sector as earnings in the salaried sector are preserved by institutional rigidities. 
The two labor force series move against each other. Critically, the same result would hold 
in the case where indexation of wages to past inflation forces salaried sector wages above 




Appendix A.2: Migration Timing 
 
Because we assume that the self-employed individual, who is willing to move to the 












































































































Labor could adjust within the first period following the shock. However, because individuals are 
non homogenous when producing in the self-employed  sector, the optimal time for leaving the 
latter may differ across workers. 
The Left Hand Side of the above expression is increasing with entrepreneurial ability. 
Namely, more able individuals earn more than less able ones. Then the opportunity cost of 
migrating  to the salaried sector at time t, without considering the direct migration costs 
corresponding to capital disinstallation, is increasing in the level of entrepreneurial capability. 
The last term of the RHS, which represents the present value of labor earnings in the salaried 
sector is identical for all individuals at time t. However, the first term of the RHS is likely to be 
different. The sign of the partial derivative of the latter with respect to f




























If the above expression appears to be positive, that would imply that the cost of migrating to the 
salaried sector at time is increasing with the level of entrepreneurial capability. If this is the case, 
then  the total cost of migration is unambiguously increasing with f
 j . As a consequence we may 
expect more able entrepreneurs to postpone their migration towards the wage sector with respect 
to less able ones. 
In the case of a shock leading to an expansion of the self-employed sector, migration can 
occur within the first period following the shock, even though capital accumulation may take 
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Following arguments similar to those presented above, we can infer that more able entrepreneurs 




Appendix A.3: Details of Johansen Cointegration Procedure 
 
The Johansen procedure allows us to test for c ointegration in a multivariate 
system. Starting from an unrestricted vector autoregressive model (VAR), the hypothesis 
of cointegration is formulated as a hypothesis of reduced rank of the long run impact 
matrix  P (Johansen, 1988, Johansen and Juselius, 1990). The VAR is generated by the 
vector z t, which defines the potential endogenous variables of the model, in our case, the 
three series. Taking first differences of the variables, the VAR can be transformed into an 
error correction model 
 
D G D G D P S z z z z D IN t t k t k t k t t t = + + + + + - - - = - 1 1 1 1 0 ... , ~ ( , ) y e e    
 
where the estimates of  ) 1 ,..., 1 ( ), ... ( 1 - = - - - - = G k i A A I i i  describe the short run 
dynamics to changes in z t and  P = - - - - ( ... ) I A A i 1 captures the long run adjustments 
and D contains deterministic terms.  
 
Cointegration occurs in the case of reduced rank of  P. If the rank is reduced (r<n) 
it is possible to factorize P into P ( ') = ab  where a  denotes the adjustment coefficients 
and  b the cointegration vectors. The cointegration vectors  b have the property that  b' zt 
is stationary even though  zt itself is non-stationary.  If the rank is reduced it is also 
possible to interpret the VAR in first differences as a vector error correction model and to 
obtain estimates of  a  and  b via the reduced rank regression. Since the rank of  P is 
equal to the number of independent cointegration vectors and the rank of P is also equal   35 
to the number of non-zero eigenvalues, the test of cointegration thus amounts to a test for 
the number of non-zero eigenvalues. The trace statistics,l trace, is a non-standard 
distributed likelihood-ratio test, which is commonly used to determine the number of 
cointegration vectors, (Johansen, 1988). The trace statistic tests the null hypothesis that 
there are at most r cointegration vectors: 
       H0:  i l =0, for i = r+1,..n  
where only the first r eigenvalues,  l , are non-zero against the unrestricted hypothesis 
that   n.
26 
                                                 
26 The null hypothesis of at most r cointegration vectors implies that there are  n-r unit roots and, 
theoretically, n-r zero eigenvalues. This is because the hypothesis of cointegration is formulated as the 
reduced rank of  ' ab = P  and the full rank of  ^ ^ Gb a ' , where  a  and b are n· r matrices and  ^ a  and 
^ b are n·(n-r)  matrices orthogonal to  a  and  b . This allows us then to distinguish between  r 
+cointegrating I(0) relations and n-r non-cointegrating I(1) relations.    36 
Appendix A.3  Details on Data 
 
Country  Survey  Time Coverage 
and Frequency 
Spatial Coverage  Sample  Definition of Formal Sector All 
who  declared: 
Definition of S.E. Sector 
All who  declared: 
Brazil  Pesquisa Mensal 




From first quarter 
of 1983 to fourth 
quarter of 2002 
 
Each quarter is 
represented by 
the last month of 
that quarter. 
6 major metropolitan 
regions (covering 
25% of the national 
labor market): Paulo, 
Rio de Janeiro, Belo 
Horizonte, Porto 
Alegre, Recife and 
Salvador. 
Males above 
15 years old 
 
- to be working or to have a work 
during the survey's week 
- to be employees in their work 
- to have a work-card (carteira de 
trabalho) 
- to have NOT a work-card and to 
be working in some activity 
related to the public sector  
- to be working or to have 
a work during the survey's 
week 
- to be employers 
- to be self employed 
 




Survey of Urban 
Employment) 
From first quarter 
of 1987 to fourth 
quarter of 2004 
 
16 major urban areas, 
covering 60% of 
urban population 
Males between 
11 and 99 
years 
- to be employees of firms with 
more than 5 employees(*) with 
social benefits 
- to be owners of firms with more 
than 5 employees 
-  to be commission workers with 
social benefits 
- to be owners of firms 
with 5 or less employees 
- to be  self employed  
- to be commission 
workers without benefits 
Argentina  Encuesta 
Permanente de 





wave of 1985  to 
first wave of 
2003  (two waves 
per year, one in 
May, one in 
October) 
Gran Buenos Aires  Males between 
12 and 75 
years 
 
- to be working during the 
survey's period 
- to be employees in their work 
- to have a pension plan in their 
current employment 
 
- to be working or to have 
a work during the survey's 
week 
- to be self employed 
- to be employers in firms 
with 5 or less workers 
(**) 
Colombia  Encuesta 
Nacional de 




From first quarter 
of 1985 to second 
quarter of 2004 




Medellin, Cali, and 
Pasto) 
Males between 
11 and 99 
years with less 
than 12 years 
of 
education(***) 
Not possible to identify Formal 
Salaried, just Salaried: 
 
- those who declared to be  
working for a private firm or for 
the Government  
- to be employers 
- to be  self employed 
 
(*) Due to a modification in the questionnaire (1994), a firm is considered to be small if it has 6 or less workers for all periods before to third quarter of 1994. 
(**)Employers in big firms were dropped to avoid unnecessary pro-cyclicality in formal wages. These individuals account for a reduced number so the sector 
sizes are not affected after dropping them (e.g. in 2003 I, 2.7% of the formal workers were employers in big firms) 
(***)All observations with incomplete monetary income declarations are dropped from the sample   37 





Test for Long-Run Exclusion: 
LR-Test ( ) (
2 r c ) 
Test for Stationarity: 
LR-Test ( ) (
2 r p- c ) 
Test for Weak-Exogeneity: 
LR-Test ( ) (
2 r c ) 
Model Specification:  r  1  2  1  2  1  2 
  dgf  1  2  3  2  1  2 
  ) 5 (
2 c   3.84  5.99  7.81  5.99  3.84  5.99 
               
Mexico  nT/nN  16.97  18.67  37.96  2.74  0.57  1.92 
Lag length: 4  WT/WN  10.54  12.11  38.52  3.28  12.06  12.49 
Dummies :  P  26.06  27.82  35.22  2.87  21.22  22.03 
1995 Q1  Constant  12.6  14.4         
(Peso Crisis)               
               
Brazil  nT/nN  10.27  12.97  15.05  5.85  17.34  23.6 
Lag Length: 3  WT/WN  4.23  12.94  16.3  3.19  1.69  6.89 
Dummies:  P  13  13.3  14.8  6.3  0.13  3.1 
1994 Q2, 1991 Q1  Constant  12  12         
(Currency conversion from 
Cruzerio Real to Real; Real 
Devaluation)               
               
Colombia  nT/nN  21.58  23.38  28.18  2.91  2.83  3 
Lag Length: 2  WT/WN  11.25  13.13  27.76  2.5  3.33  5.48 
No dummies  P  12.81  15.27  28.96  4.1  24.83  25.95 
  Constant  20.6  23.1         
               
Argentina  nT/nN  8.78  13.24  31.54  5.32  18.33  24.01 
Lag Length: 4  WT/WN  27.01  33.06  23.8  2.98  0.34  6.84 
Dummies  P  10.23  11.62  32.07  5.88  1.34  2.2 
1991:1; 2002:1  Constant  9.45  12.73         
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               Table A.2: Multivariate Statistics (Residual Analysis) 
  México:  Brazil  Colombia 
Information Criteria:       
SC  -21.09  -15.81  -13.37 
HQ  -21.81  -16.52  -13.85 
Autocorrelation        
Ljung-Box:  2 c (114) = 126.3, p-val. = 0.05 
2 c (150) = 159, p-val.= 0.18 
2 c (99) = 129.5, p-value = 0.02 
LM(1)  2 c (9) = 8.1, p-value = 0.53 
2 c (9) = 4.52, p-value = 0.87 
2 c (9) = 7.6, p –value = 0.58 
LM(4)  2 c (9) = 17.2, p-value = 0.05 
2 c (9) = 13.1, p-value = 0.16 
2 c (9) = 7.9, p –value = 0.54 
Normality  2 c (6) = 9.94, p-value = 0.13 
2 c (6) = 16.4, p-value = 0.01 
2 c (6) = 31.5, p-value = 0.00 
 
 
      
             Table A.3: Univariate Test Statistics (Residual Analysis) 
        Mexico      Brazil      Colombia 
        nT/nN  WT/WN  p  nT/nN  WT/WN  p  nT/nN  WT/WN  p 
Skewness        -0.066  -0.446  0.718  -0.168  -0.574  0.567  0.2750  -0.1402  -0.014 
Kurtosis        2.345  3.785  3.940  2.682  4.118  4.765  5.8000  4.3100  3.8161 
ARCH        0.941  5.077  2.307  1.850  5.473  2.005  4.3170  2.7780  3.3060 
Normality        0.830  4.061  5.884  0.482  5.983  9.846  19.6240  7.6740  4.4030 
R
2        0.290  0.470  0.765  0.291  0.217  0.461  0.4050  0.3840  0.4110 
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Table A.4 

















l trace test               




*  35.10  31.88 
r  £  1  r > 1  11.38  13.32  19.54  6.43  20.17  17.79 
r  £  2  r > 2  0.53  5.71  5.36  1.69  9.10  7.50 
*Rejection at the 5% level of significance
27  
 
Table A.5 : Adjustment Coefficients 
  Argentina  Brazil  Colombia  Mexico 
Sample 
Variables      
full  full  1983-94  1994-‘97  1998-02  full  1987-04  1987-91  1992-97  1998-04 































































Note: D indicates a variable in first differences. t statistics in parentheses.  
 
                                                 
27 The Reinsel-Ahn small sample corrected critical value at the 10% level is 43.13 for Mexico, 39.53 for Brazil and 36.32 for Colombia).  